The Psychology of Going for 2: A Case Study
Detroit Lions head coach Matt Patricia isn’t the greatest in-game strategist, but on one gloomy November afternoon he got something right: He elected to go for 2, trailing by 8 after a 4th quarter touchdown. Of course, the attempt failed, and the Lions didn’t score again, falling 35-27 to the Dallas Cowboys. This left the door open for media and fan scrutiny, many of whom feel really strongly that you should just kick the extra point in that situation.
I disagree. This is my attempt to convert anyone who thinks that this newfangled analytics stuff is taking over the game they love.
The scene
Let’s recap the exact scenario, for transparency’s sake. With 5:49 to go in the 4th quarter, the Lions scored a touchdown to pull within 8 points. Rather than kicking the extra point to cut the deficit to 7, Matt Patricia opted to attempt a two-point conversion, a strategy that is slowly gaining traction in the brave new world of football analytics. I was in attendance for this game, and fell into the knee-jerk trap of saying “what are they doing?”, along with pretty much everyone in my general vicinity.
But then my spidey senses started tingling (overthinking is my superpower), and I knew that I had learned about win-probability along my travels as a fan and student of the game. After some quick fact-checking, I began my quest to try and calm down the angry mob. This proved to be a futile effort, as people have deep-rooted ties to the way football has always been played.
I thought to myself, maybe it’s just the heat of the moment. I’ll try again later. But no, in the hours, and even days following the game, some people still think the decision to go for 2 was really dumb. Here is just a sample of some of the retorts that were vehemently spewed back in my direction as I tried to calmly explain why Patricia’s decision was correct:
“You NEVER go for 2 in that situation” (Generic. Need more info)
“The goal is to get to overtime” (Is it, though?)
“You should go for 2 after the second touchdown, not the first” (We’ll debunk this later)
“Football is played on a field, not on a calculator” (Technically, that’s real talk)
The facts
There have been many outlets who have covered the science of going for 2 in recent years. When to do it. Who should do it. What chances it gives you to win. Lesser-known analytics sites like Predictive Football – Analysis for the Analytical Mind have championed its merits, but if that site title sounds scary to you, even good old ESPN has covered the topic with similar findings. Basically, the main takeaway is: Going for 2 in this situation (and many others) gives you a greater chance to WIN the game. It does NOT give you a better chance to get to overtime, but that isn’t the goal. What is the goal, Herm?…
“Get to overtime for the Gipper” – Knute Rockne
“Forcing overtime isn’t everything, it’s the only thing” – Vince Lombardi
“All I do is force, force, force overtime no matter what” – T-Pain
See, how silly do these legendary quotes sound when you glorify overtime?
Here is the quick and easy version of why the odds support going for 2.
The above graphic is a good quick-reference “rule of thumb” type model that is based on some assumptions, regardless of team factors, time remaining, and actual conversion probabilities. For the full meat and potatoes breakdown of all things win-probability related, my favorite analysis comes from the fine people at FiveThiryEight. Check it out here if you are so inclined.
Basically, if your goal is to win the game (which it should be) then you should go for 2 because the odds of missing both conversions are lower than the odds of successfully making the first.
So, what are some of the common mental hurdles that people are getting tripped up on that make the decision to go for 2 seem so crazy? Let’s snoop around inside the minds of the misinformed.
Glorifying OT
If I had to rank the reasons going for 2 makes people squeamish, this probably would rank number one. People treat getting to overtime like some sort of victory, which it is in some respects. Your team just came from behind, down multiple scores in the 4th quarter to tie it up. The crowd is going crazy. Awkward high fives between drunk strangers. More football!
Except there is still a 50% chance that you will lose after getting to overtime. All those big plays you made to get to OT. All the odds overcome. Fighting against history, the clock, and the team that put you in that hole in the first place. You overcame all of it…and still need to win a coin flip (literally and figuratively) to win the game.
Bad assumptions
The opponents of the going for 2 strategy are making some mental errors that are undermining their decision-making process. One of which is assuming that kicking the extra point has a 100% success rate. Depending on your sample, the league average XP conversion rate is around 94%. In the past two seasons alone, nine teams have an XP conversion rate of less than 90%. Multiply this by the fact that you need to make two XPs just to tie, and the risk of missing one is too significant to just brush under the rug. Even the great Matt Prater has missed seven XPs in his Lions career (including one this year).
The next bad assumption is related to the psychological mind-trap called catastrophizing. Catastrophizing is an irrational thought people have in believing that something is far worse than it actually is. In relation to the scary two-point conversion attempt, people seem to be expecting failure in this scenario far more than success, when each is nearly equally likely. The typical two-point conversion rate is about 48% for the average NFL team.
See? Why would you go for two when your odds are below 50%. It doesn’t make sense. – Anonymous
Because the safety net of being able to take a mulligan after failing and make good after the second TD tips the scales in your favor. Again, you need to fail twice in order for this strategy to backfire, which is only a 27% likelihood based on league averages. Even if you pull an SOL move and say “the Lions are terrible! They aren’t an average team!” (even though they have a top-five passing offense and Jeff Driskel is clearly the real deal) you can slash another 10% off the league conversion average and the math still favors going for 2.
Again, check out the FiveThirtyEight model, which includes all variations of time remaining and quality of team ranges for the raw data.
Going for it only on the second TD eliminates the benefits
You see this scenario all the time. A team scores a TD late to pull within 1, and decides to go for 2 to win rather than kick the XP. Even some opponents of going for 2 down 8 are supportive of it. This makes no sense, because it takes away all of the baked-in goodies. The beauty of going for 2 down 8 is in the aforementioned safety net provided if you fail the first chance. There is also something to be gained from knowing what scenario you will be faced with down the road.
Was the first attempt successful? What defense did the other team show on the first attempt? Should we show different personnel? Just like with clock management, more information is always good (as long as you use it). If you are a supporter of going for 2 down 1, it should be implied that you support going for 2 down 8. It’s both or neither, take your pick. *Pro-tip* Pick going for 2.
Where’s the evidence?
This might actually be the best argument for the XP lovers, but it still isn’t relevant. The math has always favored going for 2, since 2 point conversions became a thing in 1994. However, the moving of the XP distance to the 15-yard line in 2015 has contributed to the abundance of missed kicks in recent years, further pushing coaches toward the go for 2 mentality (at least theoretically).
That being said, teams have been hesitant to pull the trigger in these scenarios for a variety of reasons, and until recently simply didn’t go for 2 when leading by 8, period. There were only two instances between 2000-2017 of teams going for 2 down 8, and they were both extenuating circumstances (botched snap, snowstorm). Matt Patricia, however, became the fifth coach to try the win-probability approach in the past two seasons. The tide is shifting. The age of enlightenment is upon us.
Risk of scrutiny might be one of the leaders in the clubhouse for reasons why coaches don’t go for it. As the Lions scenario is proving, it opens up more questions and criticism for the losing coach. Just check this Freep headline:
Matt Patricia offers baffling explanation for Detroit Lions’ 2-point try
Patricia’s explanation wasn’t baffling at all: “What do we think our best chances are?” “And then really what you do is you fast forward to the end of the game and say, ‘All right, are you going to be going for a two-point play here or not?” “Once I kind of go through that thought process there and decide that, probably in the situation we were in, we’re going for two at the end of the game, then really what you want to do is you want to take a shot at two two-point plays. And hopefully, you get the first. If you don’t, then you can go to your second two-point play at the end, and then obviously, go for the tie at that point.”
Bingo. Yet Dave Birkett, two-time Michigan sportswriter of the year (so he says. Show me the trophies) interprets that explanation as “baffling”. Well, Jonny blogger gets it. Where’s my sportswriting award?
It is important to remember, we don’t know that Patricia’s decision didn’t work, because the Lions didn’t score again. If they had scored a second TD and successfully converted (sending the game to OT), I highly doubt people would be criticizing the decision, even with the exact same result on the first TD. In fact, none of the teams who have taken the “risk that really isn’t a risk” to go for 2 have checked all the boxes necessary (prevent the other team from scoring, score the second TD, go for 2 and convert/fail).
So to sum up, the people who are up in arms about how stupid the decision was are complaining about uncharted territory. Take a step back, and keep an open mind. Here is a quick sports-themed therapy session from terrific neuroscientist/fantasy football analyst Renee Miller of The Athletic:
“Our brains may default to their lazy shortcuts, but they are what is called plastic. They can be changed by experience. At first, conflicting ideas are rejected, held beliefs justified, and new data ignored, but slowly, with repeated exposure the new can become familiar. I’m of the belief that continually updating my brain is good for it. Refusing to get stuck in habitual thinking takes practice, and takes going out of your comfort zone. Listen to different opinions. Look at statistics.”
Do as the lady says. She’s smarter than you.
Enough of the numbers, let’s talk real football
I’ll finish my campaign by stepping away from the data, because if you haven’t been convinced yet, I need to take a different approach.
Oftentimes when I am having a conversation with a football purist (aka stubborn old guy) and I get too analytical-y I will get some push back. It can come in many forms, but the gist of it is, football is a man’s game. It’s not for nerds working on spreadsheets.
I think this is just a defense mechanism, used to throw me off my game when I get on a roll of making a lot of great points.
I just want to reiterate that behind all this data and probabilities and odds and metrics and analytics and yada yada yada…there is still a football game being played. It’s still about executing a play, outcoaching the other guy, and being physically and mentally better than your opponent.
Sticking to the “kick the XP and go to overtime” mentality is basically like coaching not to lose, rather than coaching to win. Who makes decisions out of a fear of failure, rather than expecting success? LOSERS, THAT’S WHO!
What’s truer to the spirit of real football? Kicking an extra point, or one goal-line play to either convert or fail? Kicking is for nerds. Shoutout to Jake Ciely (@allinkid) and the #BanKickers movement. Get em’ out of the game altogether and we can be done with this argument.
Nerd mic drop
Finish him, Benjamin Morris of FiveThirtyEight:
“Despite all evidence to the contrary, football stubbornly clings to the notion that experience always trumps analysis. Although NFL coaches have a level of expertise about the game of football that most of us will never approach, it’s hard to give them the benefit of the doubt when they’ve collectively demonstrated an inability to master basic tactical decisions.”
Wait, Benjamin Morris of FiveThirtyEight, he’s still twitching.
“There is no excuse for professional coaches to make such simple mistakes. If you’re a coach, you should be doing this analysis yourself — or doing it better. If you’re still kicking extra points 14 times more often than going for 2, you’re not doing your job. If you’re in the sports media and you haven’t mastered this material, and won’t hold coaches accountable for not doing their jobs, then you’re not doing your job either.”
Nerd fatality